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1

Between 2005 and 2009, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
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Richard Perry for allowing me to pursue this project, Jen Olson for her insightful thoughts
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(hereinafter “DTA”), Military Commissions Act of 2006 (hereinafter
3
“MCA06”), and Military Commissions Act of 2009 (hereinafter
“MCA09”) were each passed by Congress and signed into law by either
President Bush or President Obama. Add to that threesome the
4
Authorization for Use of Military Force (hereinafter “AUMF”), and
you have the complete legislative underpinnings of military detention in
the War on Terror. Despite two attempts by Congress and the President
to block the judiciary from significant involvement (or interference,
depending on one’s point of view) in the detention of terrorism
suspects, the judiciary grasped control through a series of Supreme
5
Court decisions. Since the last of these decisions, Boumediene v. Bush,
which granted Guantanamo Bay detainees habeas corpus rights,
Congress and the President have largely abdicated control over the rules
of detention to the judiciary, other than the notable exception of
reforming the military commissions system in 2009.
With terrorism policy often dominating the headlines and political
discussion in Washington, the premise that Congress and the Executive
have abdicated the issue to the courts may seem farfetched. Indeed, it
seems there are daily newspaper articles and congressional discussions
about the best way to detain, interrogate, and try terrorism suspects.
Unfortunately, though, all of this talk and coverage increasingly leads to
partisans retreating to their respective corners to score political points
off of heated national security and civil-liberties rhetoric. While
Congress and the President argue back and forth about the particular
terrorism case of the day, unelected federal judges are left the
unenviable, and to some judges, unwanted, task of de facto legislating
lasting detention policy.
If one accepts the premise that all the talk in the halls of Congress
regarding detention policy is just that — talk — the question becomes,
and comments, and Ben Wittes and Robert Chesney for their advice in drafting the Terrorist
Detention Review Reform Act.
1
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat. 2680,
2739-44 (2005).
2
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
3
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190,
2574-2614 (2009).
4
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (authorizing “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. . . .”).
5
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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given the clear congressional interest in the issue, why the inertia on
legislative progress? The transfer of power from President Bush to
President Obama in 2009 gave many Obama supporters the hope that he
would dramatically alter detention policy and move to a law
6
enforcement model where all suspects would be tried or released. Much
to their disappointment, President Obama has found it prudent to
continue many of the detention policies of his predecessor, including
7
indefinite detention without trial. At least with respect to the policies
that President Obama has chosen to continue, there appears to be some
degree of broad agreement in Congress. Congressional proponents of a
8
“try or release” policy, for example, are now few and far between. With
the universe of disagreement shrinking and federal judges asking for
9
legislative guidance, it must be asked why there has been no action on
6

See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Obama Should Not Delay Closure
of Guantanamo and Military Comm’ns, Says ACLU (Jan. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/obama-should-not-delay-closure-guantanamo-andmilitary-commissions-says-aclu (“[D]etainees should be prosecuted in our traditional courts,
which are the best in the world and fully capable of handling sensitive national security
issues without compromising fundamental rights. If there is not [sufficient evidence],
detainees should be repatriated to countries that don’t practice torture. Fundamental and
transformative change is neither incremental nor tentative.”).
7
In his speech at the National Archives, President Obama endorsed military detention
for those detainees “who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, but who nonetheless pose a
threat to the security of the United States,” and received criticism from civil liberties
organizations. Peter Finn, Obama Endorses Indefinite Detention Without Trial for Some,
WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article
/2009/05/21/AR2009052104045.html. In March 2011, President Obama issued an executive
order governing long-term detention review for Guantanamo detainees. Press Release, The
White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order — Periodic Review of Individuals
Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-baynava (at the time of publication the Executive Order had not yet been published in the
Federal Register).
8
But cf. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventative Detention, Suspected Terrorists,
and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 727 (2009) (noting that some human rights groups
maintain that the government must “try or release” military detainees).
9
Several District of Columbia District Court judges have been vocal in urging Congress
to provide guidance on habeas procedures and expressing trepidation with the current
process. Judge Thomas F. Hogan, who coordinates the detainee cases, has stated that “[i]t is
unfortunate, in my view, that the Legislative Branch of the government, and the Executive
Branch, have not moved more strongly to provide uniform, clear rules and laws for handling
these cases,” and “I think that would have been best for the Legislature to have passed new
rules and procedures and rules of evidence to handle these cases.” Lyle Denniston,
Commentary: Did Boumediene Leave Too Much Undone?,SCOTUSBLOG, (Dec. 22, 2009,
5:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/12/commentary-did-boumediene-leave-too-
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the part of Congress?
Undoubtedly, for some in Congress, detention policy is worth more
as a political issue than as a potential policy accomplishment. That is,
even if one could wave a magic wand and instantly create a policy
compromise that left all parties satisfied, some in Congress might
decline in order to keep the political issue alive. While the specter of
our legislative representatives playing politics with war policy is cynical
and depressing, that motivation cannot be discounted. Similarly,
detention issues may reemerge in the news with each foiled attack and
judicial order of release, giving politicians an opportunity to demagogue
and attack the other side while avoiding any responsibility for the
consequences of policy decisions. In sum, by allowing the judiciary to
take the lead on detention policy, Congress avoids the tough decisions
and responsibility that comes therewith, while keeping a potent political
issue alive.
What, then, of the President? During his campaign, President
Obama certainly had harsh words for President Bush on his handling of
10
detention policy, and action was quick once the new administration
was installed. The Obama administration began with an executive order
setting a deadline for the closing of the detention center at Guantanamo
11
12
Bay. President Obama basked in applause as he ordered the closing of
much-undone/. Judge Reggie Walton said, “It should be Congress that decides a policy such
as this that has a monumental impact on our society and makes a monumental impression on
the world community.” Chief Judge Royce Lamberth said, “How confident can I be that if I
make the wrong choice that he won’t be the one that blows up the Washington Monument or
the Capitol?” Chisun Lee, Judges Urge Congress to Act on Indefinite Terrorism Detentions,
PROPUBLICA (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/judges-urge-congress-to-acton-indefinite-terrorism-detentions-122.
10
See Sam Graham-Felsen, Obama Statement on Today’s Supreme Court Decision,
ORG. FOR AM. (June 12, 2008, 4:16:05 PM), http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/
post/samgrahamfelsen/gG5Gz5 (“The Court’s [Boumediene] decision is a rejection of the
Bush Administration’s attempt to create a legal black hole at Guantanamo. . . “).
11
Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
12
See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, President Obama Orders
Guantanamo Closed and End to Torture (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/president-obama-orders-guantanamo-closed-and-endtorture (quoting Anthony D. Romero, Executive Director of the ACLU, as saying,
“President Obama should be highly commended for this bold and decisive action so early in
his administration on an issue so critical to restoring an America we can be proud of again,”
and Caroline Fredrickson, Director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office as saying,
“[b]y shutting Guantanamo, ending torture, and closing the CIA secret prisons abroad,
President Obama has given America a much-needed and significant break from the Bush
administration policies that, with utter disregard for our Constitution, trampled our nation’s
values and ideals.”).
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a prison that both his predecessor and election opponent aspired to close
13
as well. Meanwhile, the administration avoided answering the
questions that would have set the stage for fulfillment of the executive
14
order’s deadline. Task forces were formed and prosecution protocols
15
were issued, but basic policy questions were left to the future and the
courts. Who may the President detain, for how long, and under what
evidentiary standard? What process will detainees receive beyond their
habeas proceedings? How will the administration respond to a court
order of release into the United States?
Rather than answer these questions through a comprehensive plan,
the administration decided to allow litigation to drive the policy process,
deciding issues on an ad hoc basis. Surely, one of the reasons for this
course was President Obama’s desire to avoid alienating his supporters
by validating President Bush’s detention theory. The few decisions
President Obama made in this area, such as negotiating and embracing
the MCA09, nibbled around the edges of President Bush’s military
16
detention and trial policy, but certainly did not reject it wholesale.
The current political environment creates incentives for both
Congress and the President to abdicate their responsibility for
legislating detention policy to the judiciary. As a result of Boumediene,
federal courts are more involved in military detention than ever, and
13
Maria Bartiromo, The Unvarnished McCain, BUSINESSWEEK, June 4, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_23/b4037095.htm (quoting Senator
McCain as saying, “[w]hen I’m President, I will close Guantanamo Bay.”); Melissa
McNamara, Bush Says He Wants to Close Guantanamo, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/08/politics/main1596464.shtml (quoting President
Bush as saying, “I very much would like to end Guantanamo.”).
14
Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (creating a task force to
review “the status of each individual currently detained at Guantanamo. . . .”); Exec. Order
No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) (creating a task force to review future
detention policy); see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 419
(2010) (“[T]he Obama White House crafted a mechanism for detention policy-making to
reflect this political pressure: Delegating the hard decisions to someone else who would take
the political heat.”).
15
DEP’T OF DEF. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATION OF GUANTANAMO CASES
REFERRED FOR PROSECUTION (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents
/taba-prel-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf.
16
The MCA09 altered a number of provisions of the MCA06, including changes in
nomenclature, hearsay and voluntariness standards, and the prohibition of the use of
statements elicited through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. See JENNIFER
ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41163, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009:
OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ISSUES (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R41163.pdf (comparing the provisions of MCA06 to MCA09).
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they are doing their best to fashion reasonable detention rules in the
absence of guidance by either the Supreme Court or the political
17
branches of government. Federal judges, though, do not have expertise
in military or intelligence matters, and they do not answer to the
electorate. American citizens and soldiers deserve greater input from the
18
political branches. Policymaking by the judiciary in this area leads to
inconsistent, ad hoc decisions that are opaque to the average voter.
While Candidate Obama argued that detention policy was a “legal black
19
hole” under President Bush, the issue has become a political black hole
under President Obama.
This article will focus on the reforms to military detention policy
proposed in the Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act (hereinafter
20
“TDERRA”). Part I will examine the President’s authority to detain
enemy belligerents in the War on Terror. Part II will discuss the
procedures of the habeas corpus proceedings for current and future
enemy belligerents. Finally, Part III will consider additional issues that
are not addressed in TDERRA — the process for enemy belligerents
determined to be lawfully held by a habeas court and the future of the
Guantanamo Bay detention center.
17
While I argue that the procedures for military detention should be created by
Congress and the President, some commentators argue that the Supreme Court should have
been more detailed in its discussion of the habeas right recognized in Boumediene. One of
such commentators has written:
The net result of Boumediene, therefore, was to leave the substantive law of
executive detention incrementally murkier than before. While doctrinal
ambiguity is often one outcome of Supreme Court review, it is at last peculiar
that an opinion justified as a means to promote legal certainty would leave so
much for subsequent resolution through an inevitably fragmented process of
district court resolution and appellate clarification. Boumediene, that is, can be
criticized for failing to promote the legal clarity that was one of its central
normative premises. It was, from on one view, an exercise in legality without
law.
Huq, supra note 14, at 412.
18
See Cole, supra note 8, at 694. I do not argue that the government lacks “existing
laws and authorities…to effectuate preventive detention,” which Professor Cole comments
is “overstat[ing] the case.” Id. Rather, I agree that there is existing authority for preventive
detention, but the procedures for implementing preventive detention are being designed by
federal judges, rather than Congress and the President. The greatest benefit of new
legislation would be refining the operation of preventive detention, not creating a prevention
regime where there was none before.
19
E.g. Graham-Felsen, supra note 10.
20
S. 3707, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Detention of Unprivileged Enemy Belligerents
Act, S. 553, 112th Cong. (2011) (incorporating a number of alterations designed to attract
broader Republican support in the Senate).
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I. AUTHORITY TO DETAIN
21

In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the AUMF
granted the President the authority to detain individuals, including
22
citizens, in the War on Terror. In addition to relying on the AUMF as
the source of detention authority, the Bush administration relied on the
23
presidential authority inherent in Article II. This practice was in
24
keeping with that administration’s (possibly shortsighted) desire to
expand the power of the presidency and involve Congress as little as
possible in wartime decision-making. From the executive system of
25
military commissions that was struck down by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, to
opposition to congressional limitations on the interrogation of terrorism
26
suspects, to reliance on executive power as a means to detain, the Bush
administration was consistent in its desire to rely upon its Article II
power to the fullest.
The Obama administration, on the other hand, has relied on the
AUMF as the President’s sole source of power to detain enemy
27
belligerents. This is not surprising, given President Obama’s intention
to distance his administration from the terrorism policies of the Bush
administration that he so roundly criticized as a presidential

21

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Id. at 518.
23
E.g. Brief for the Respondents at 13-14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(No. 03-6696), 2003 U.S. Briefs 6696.
24
See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 212 (2007) (“[T]he Bush administration’s strategy is guaranteed not
to work, and is certain to destroy trust altogether. When an administration makes little
attempt to work with the other institutions of our government and makes it a public priority
to emphasize that its aim is to expand its power, Congress, the courts, and the public listen
carefully, and worry.”).
25
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
26
See Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01/04/bush_could_bypass_new_torture_b
an/ (“The White House tried hard to kill the McCain amendment [banning cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment of detainees].”).
27
E.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No.
08-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/
documents/BatesRevisedDetAuthFINAL.pdf?rd=1
[hereinafter
Memorandum
of
Respondents].
22
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28

candidate. While relying solely on statutory authority for its detention
power and changing some of the legal nomenclature that retained
29
political baggage from the Bush years, the Obama administration did
not reject Bush’s detention policy. The administration continued to
detain individuals under the law of war, albeit while aggressively
attempting to transfer many detainees to other countries and refusing to
30
add new detainees to the Guantanamo population. Even these policies,
though, were not drastic changes from the Bush administration. After
all, President Bush announced his intention to close Guantanamo Bay,
and new transfers to the detention center largely halted in
31
2004. Indeed, the Obama administration’s most controversial departure
from existing detainee policy occurred when Attorney General Eric
Holder announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other 9/11
co-conspirators held at Guantanamo Bay would be tried in civilian
32
courts in New York, but that decision was widely criticized by
33
34
Congress and the American people, and it was reevaluated in short
35
order.
28

See, e.g., Graham-Felsen, supra note 10.
Both the MCA09 and the March 13, 2009 detention definition submitted by the
government abandoned the term “enemy combatant,” with the MCA09 using “enemy
belligerent” in its stead. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 180107, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-2614 (2009); see also Memorandum of Respondents, supra note
27, at 1-3, 7, 8, 11-12.
30
The success of the Obama administration in transferring and releasing detainees is
debatable. As of April 2010, fifty-two detainees were released post-Boumediene, but the
annualized number of releases dropped after the decision. Huq, supra note 14, at 408, 418.
31
Id. at 405 (“Anecdotal information suggests that inflows to the base in fact largely
dried up in 2004, after the Supreme Court’s first interventions in the field.”).
32
Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/us/14terror.html.
33
Eighteen senators introduced an amendment to deny the Department of Justice
funding for the trials, but it failed to get the sixty votes necessary for passage in November
2009. There is press speculation that if offered again, the legislation may receive enough
votes for passage. See Kasie Hunt, Senators Try to Block Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Trial,
POLITICO, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32382.html; Michael
Isikoff, No KSM in NYC?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/
blogs/declassified/2010/01/15/no-ksm-in-nyc.html.
34
See Lydia Saad, Americans at Odds With Recent Terror Trial Decisions, GALLUP
(Nov. 27, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/124493/Americans-Odds-Recent-Terror-TrialDecisions.aspx?CSTS=tagrss (discussing a poll showing that a majority of Americans
believed that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed should be tried by military commission outside of
New York City, and were “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” that a trial would
give KSM a forum to further his cause).
35
Anne E. Kornblut & Peter Finn, Obama Advisers Set to Recommend Military
29
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The Obama administration has avoided testing the breadth of
executive detention power in two areas that the Bush administration at
least initially embraced — the detention of both American citizens and
permanent legal residents captured in the United States. In the Rumsfeld
36
37
v. Padilla and al-Marri v. Pucciarelli cases, respectively, the Bush
administration detained a citizen and a permanent legal resident
captured in the United States under the law of war. Padilla was litigated
38
before the Supreme Court (and remanded on jurisdictional grounds)
before the Fourth Circuit affirmed the power of the executive to detain
39
citizens captured in the United States. Before the case could reach the
Supreme Court again, it was rendered moot by the Bush
administration’s decision to transfer Padilla to the criminal justice
40
system, albeit not without controversy. The Fourth Circuit opinion,
however, was not vacated by the Supreme Court, so the judiciallyrecognized power of the President to detain citizens captured in the
United States remains on the books.
In al-Marri, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the power of the President
to detain legal permanent residents captured in the United
41
States. Again, after certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court,
the case was rendered moot when the government, this time led by
President Obama, transferred al-Marri to the criminal justice
42
system. However, unlike Padilla, the Supreme Court vacated the
43
Fourth Circuit decision in al-Marri.
Without Supreme Court guidance on Padilla and al-Marri,
multiple questions regarding the extent of the President’s authority to
detain combatants in the War on Terror remain. While the Fourth
Circuit decision in Padilla still stands, whether the Supreme Court
Tribunals for Alleged 9/11 Plotters, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2010, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/04/AR2010030405209.html.
36
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
37
al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam),
vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
38
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443.
39
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005).
40
The Fourth Circuit denied the government’s motion to transfer Padilla to civilian law
enforcement custody as an attempt to avoid Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court
ultimately allowed the transfer. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 2005),
overruled by Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084-85 (2006).
41
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d at 216.
42
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545.
43
Compare id., with Padilla, 546 U.S. at 1084.
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would ultimately ratify that decision remains up for debate. Likewise,
with the Fourth Circuit decision in al-Marri vacated, it is unclear
whether the President has the power to detain legal permanent residents
captured in the United States as part of the ongoing conflict against Al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Further, it is uncertain if the
President has that authority, whether that authority is derived from the
AUMF, the President’s inherent authority under Article II of the
Constitution, or both.
A. Congressional Reaffirmation of Detention Authority
Given the uncertainty in this area, Congress and the President
should provide statutory guidance to the courts regarding their view of
the President’s detention power. This need not be done in the form of a
new congressional authorization, nor as an attempt to define the outer
limits of the President’s inherent authority under Article II of the
Constitution. Indeed, attempting the former would be politically
44
impossible, and attempting the latter would be foolhardy, lest it bind
the President in future conflicts. Instead, TDERRA would reaffirm the
basic premise of the AUMF — that the United States is at war — and
therefore the President is authorized to detain enemy belligerents as part
45
of that war, regardless of the place of capture.
The statement of detention power is couched as a reaffirmation of
the power that the AUMF already gives the President, not a new
authorization, so as to dispel the impression that this is a new power and
avoid a political firestorm over congressional broadening of the AUMF.
This reaffirmation would demonstrate to the courts that Congress
intended to provide the President with detention power in the AUMF,
applicable to cases like Padilla and al-Marri. Whether the government
should ever use that power to detain citizens or legal permanent
residents captured in the United States as a matter of policy is a question
for President Obama and future presidents. Congress and the President,
though, should clarify the scope of the detention power in the AUMF
and remove that consideration to the greatest extent possible from the
44

Some in Congress have attempted to repeal the existing AUMF. See, e.g., Iraq War
Powers Repeal Act of 2006, H.R. 5875, 109th Cong. (2006); see Shailagh Murray &
Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Seek to Repeal 2002 War Authorization, WASH. POST, Feb.
23, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/22/AR20070222
01743.html.
45
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010).
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46

judiciary. Such a reaffirmation has been proposed in the past, and it
47
should be considered anew. The AUMF was an authorization of power
from one branch of the government, Congress, to another, the
48
President. It is incumbent, therefore, upon those two branches to define
the nature of that authorization. To this point, Congress and the
President have purposefully avoided addressing the ambiguities in the
AUMF on a statutory level, leaving its interpretation to the judiciary.
Given the stakes involved, asking the judiciary to fill in the known holes
of a vague authorization is unwise and shortsighted.
B. Defining the Class of Detainable Individuals
Beyond the source of detention authority, the Obama
administration has also differed, albeit slightly, from the Bush
administration’s claim of the scope of the power. While the Bush
administration asserted that it had the power to detain both members
49
and supporters of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, the
Obama administration altered the definition slightly to include members
50
and “substantial[]” supporters. Historically, habeas courts interpreted

46

See Cole, supra note 8, at 732 (discussing the problems caused by a lack of clarity as
to the scope of executive detention power). Professor Cole has expressed this view:
[T]he only congressional statement on [the scope of the detention power] is the
AUMF, which does not even mention detention....If preventive detention of
‘enemy combatants’ is to continue, it should be defined - and carefully
circumscribed - by legislation. The power to hold a human being indefinitely is
too grave to delegate to executive experimentation. Such a statute would have to
address both the proper substantive scope of the detention power, and the
procedural guarantees available to those subjected to it.
Id.
47
Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S. 3401, 110th Cong. (2008).
48
Section 2(a) of the AUMF is an authorization to the President:
(a) IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
49
See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the initial
detention standard offered by the government).
50
Id. at 870 n.1 (“[T]he government modified the definition in its initial habeas return
to replace the term ‘support’ with ‘substantially supported.’”); Memorandum of
Respondents, supra note 27, at 3.
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51

the detention power in numerous ways. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia (hereinafter “D.C. Circuit Court”)
settled this issue — at least temporarily — by interpreting the AUMF as
supporting both the Bush and Obama definitions of detainable
52
individuals. Ultimately, Al-Bihani held that under the MCA09, both
members and supporters of enemy groups are subject to the jurisdiction
of the military commissions system, and the executive’s detention
power must be at least as broad as the jurisdictional basis of the
53
MCA09. In an attempt to answer another question vexing the habeas
courts, the extent of contact with enemy groups necessary to subject an
individual to the detention authority, Al-Bihani stated that an individual
lodging with, or participating in training with an enemy group would
54
likely be sufficient. That interpretation was explicitly affirmed in AlAdahi v. Obama, which held that proof of a detainee staying at an Al
Qaeda guesthouse and training at an Al Qaeda camp was
55
“overwhelming” evidence in favor of detention.
TDERRA’s reaffirmation of detention authority would serve two
purposes: 1) providing guidance to the judiciary that the AUMF
authorizes the detention of citizens and permanent legal residents,
regardless of the place of capture; and 2) defining the level of
participation or contact with an enemy group necessary on the part of an
individual to be subject to the detention authority. As previously
discussed, the first goal could be accomplished without extending the

51
Before Al-Bihani, district court judges differed in their interpretations of whether the
AUMF allowed the detention of supporters of enemy groups and what constituted
membership and support. See BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM,
BROOKINGS INST.,THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION, THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES
AS LAWMAKING 18-20 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc
/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf.
52
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872.
53
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. The Court stated:
The provisions of the 2006 and 2009 MCAs are illuminating in this case
because the government’s detention authority logically covers a category of
persons no narrower than is covered by its military commission authority.
Detention authority in fact sweeps wider, also extending at least to traditional
P.O.W.s... and arguably to other categories of persons.
Id. at 872.
54
Id. at 873 n.2 (“[E]vidence supporting the military’s reasonable belief of either
[attending Al Qaeda training camps or visiting Al Qaeda guesthouses] with respect to a noncitizen seized abroad during the ongoing war on terror would seem to overwhelmingly, if
not definitively, justify the government’s detention …”).
55
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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existing AUMF, leaving the decision of whether, as a matter of policy,
to detain citizens and legal permanent residents captured in the United
States to President Obama and future presidents. Fulfilling the second
goal would finally provide guidance to the judiciary as to the
individuals Congress and the President view as sufficiently part of the
enemy war effort to justify detention.
In reaffirming the detention authority of the President, TDERRA
defines the power as extending to an individual who: 1) has engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; 2) has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners; or 3) was a member of, part of, or
operated in a clandestine, covert, or military capacity on behalf of the
56
Taliban, Al Qaeda, or associated forces. This definition is a melding of
57
the Obama administration’s detention definition from March 13, 2009,
58
the “unprivileged enemy belligerent” definition from the MCA09, and
new language designed to more clearly define the contacts and
participation necessary to submit an individual to the government’s
detention authority.
The goal of TDERRA’s definition of the President’s detention
power is clarification, not an extension of the detention power beyond
what is already recognized by the courts. In addition to incorporating
members of enemy groups and those who have engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its partners, the proposed definition builds
off the discussion in Al-Bihani: that the government’s detention
authority extends at least as far as the jurisdictional basis of the
MCA09, and that those training and boarding with enemy groups would
59
likely be covered. Because individuals can be tried under the MCA09
60
for “purposefully and materially supporting” an enemy group, it
follows that such an action would be sufficient to trigger the
government’s detention power. Similarly, as Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi
indicate that those who train or lodge with enemy groups are subject to
61
the government’s detention authority, surely those who “operate in a
56

S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (2010).
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870 n.1; Memorandum of Respondents, supra note 27.
58
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2647
(2009).
59
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872-73.
60
Military Commissions Act of 2009 § 1802.
61
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2; Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
57
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clandestine, covert, or military capacity” for such groups would be
62
covered.
C. Defining “associated forces”
While defining the extent of contact that an individual must have
with an enemy group to be covered under the President’s detention
authority would help clarify the breadth of the detention power,
Congress and the President should take the additional step of creating a
system to define the “associated forces” hostile to the United States and
its coalition. In short, this is the question of with whom the United
States and its coalition forces are at war. As such, this question is
properly answered by the political branches. There have been calls for
the administration to publish a definitive list of organizations considered
63
to be “associated forces.” A list would certainly offer some degree of
simplicity and transparency. However, at least three potential problems
would accompany the implementation of such a list. First, new groups
may emerge at any time, necessitating last minute additions to the list,
which would likely be met with skepticism by the judiciary. Second,
there may be logistical problems within the bureaucracy in clearing a
group for inclusion on the list, which would be imperative if the list was
considered definitive. Third, the public nature of such a list, while
having the benefit of transparency, could also cause foreign policy
challenges if, for example, a particular group to be considered an
“associated force” is not viewed similarly by a coalition partner or
friendly host country.
Instead of creating a comprehensive public list upon which the
administration would rely in arguing to the courts that a particular
organization is an “associated force” covered under the President’s
detention power, TDERRA provides the administration with a statutory
opportunity to certify to a habeas court that the administration considers
a particular organization an “associated force[] of the Taliban or Al
64
Qaeda.” In turn, the bill directs the judiciary to give such a

62

S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (2010).
See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES & COLLEEN A. PEPPARD, BROOKINGS INST., DESIGNING
DETENTION, A MODEL LAW FOR TERRORIST INCAPACITATION 37 (2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes/0626_detent
ion_wittes.pdf.
64
S. 3707, § 2(d).
63
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65

determination by the executive “utmost deference.” Such a procedure
would retain the traditional power of the executive to determine with
whom the United States is in hostilities, while allowing the judiciary to
review such a finding for blatant misuse.
D. Potential Criticism of Detention Power Reaffirmation
Critics of TDERRA’s reaffirmation of the President’s detention
power would likely argue that any such proposal would be in danger of:
1) establishing the outer bounds of the President’s inherent authority to
detain enemy belligerents under Article II of the Constitution; or 2)
expanding the statutory detention power granted in the AUMF. For the
first, the concern on the political right that such a statute would bound
the inherent authority of the President is relieved by a rule of
construction that the statutory statement of authority should not be
interpreted as limiting or affecting the inherent authority of the
66
President under Article II. For the second, the concern on the political
left would likely be that such a statute would amount to a new
authorization giving the President detention powers that are not granted
67
by the AUMF. The Fourth Circuit decision in Padilla that the
President may detain an enemy belligerent citizen captured in the
68
United States still stands, so Congress and the President should
embrace that judicially sanctioned power. It is possible that different
habeas procedures would apply to individuals captured in the United
69
States, including a higher standard of proof.
Those on the political left would also likely argue that the proposed
definition of “unprivileged enemy belligerent,” including its
incorporation of those who “operated in a clandestine, covert, or
65

Id.
Id. § 2(b)(3) (“The authority under this section shall not be construed to alter or limit
the authority of the President under the Constitution of the United States to detain
combatants in the continuing armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces, or in any other armed conflict.”).
67
See Huq, supra note 14, at 430 (lamenting that “the only kind of legislative action
that could pass would expand detention authority and further restrict the fragmented and
incomplete influence of habeas review.”).
68
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
69
In Al-Bihani, the D.C. Circuit Court refused to state the minimum standard of proof
required for non-citizens captured abroad, let alone citizens or non-citizens captured in the
United States. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“We
emphasize our opinion does not endeavor to identify what standard would represent the
minimum required by the Constitution.”).
66
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military capacity” for enemy groups, would extend the detention power
70
beyond the March 13, 2009, “substantial support” language. While it is
true that TDERRA’s definition is broader than the March 13 definition,
71
it is well within the confines of the discussion in Al-Bihani. As
previously discussed, the interpretation in Al-Bihani that the President’s
detention power extends at least as far as the jurisdictional basis of the
MCA09, and that individuals who trained or lodged with enemy groups
are likely covered by the detention power, currently controls the habeas
cases being litigated in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia (hereinafter “D.C. District Court”).
Some may argue that the extensive discussion of detention
authority in Al-Bihani was dictum and that, in the end, the court ratified
72
the administration’s detention definition. For example, in Salahi v.
Obama, Judge Robertson stated that the standard approved in Al-Bihani
was “those who purposefully and materially supported such forces in
73
hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.” In fact, while Al-Bihani
stated that the detention power extends at least as broadly as the
jurisdictional basis of the MCA09, the original standard argued by the
government in that case covered those who were “part of or supporting
70

S.3707 § 2(a)(6). The definitional framework of the government states:
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those
attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of,
or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaida forces or associated forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,
including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly
supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.
Memorandum of Respondents, supra note 27, at 3.
71
The jurisdictional basis of the MCA09 covers those who engaged in hostilities,
purposefully and materially supported hostilities, and were part of Al Qaeda. The new
language in the proposed definition, “was a member of, part of, or operated in a clandestine,
covert, or military capacity on behalf of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces,” would
be unlikely to encompass persons beyond the MCA09 definition, as “operating in a
clandestine, covert, or military capacity” would overlap with “purposeful and material
support.” See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat.
2190, 2647 (2009).
72
In regards to the Al-Bihani discussion on the force of international law, where the
majority argued that “[t]he international laws of war as a whole have not been implemented
domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts,” a
similar dictum argument has been made, most notably in a concurring opinion. Cf. AlBihani, 590 F.3d at 885 (Williams, J., concurring).
73
Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at
872), vacated, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” and the
74
ultimate standard replaced “support” with “substantially supported.” In
any case, Judge Robertson misconstrues the standard to require the
individual’s acts to be in support of the hostilities, rather than allowing
the acts to be generally in support of a group which is engaged in
hostilities. Judge Robertson goes so far as to explicitly criticize the
decision in Al-Bihani that the detention authority is at least as broad as
75
the jurisdictional basis of the MCA09. While Salahi is doubtless a
notable post-Al-Bihani interpretation of the detention standard, it seems
to be an outlier in that it is unlikely that other district court judges will
disregard Al-Bihani’s strong statement in favor of a broad detention
power.
Regardless of the inevitable criticism by some on both sides of the
political spectrum, Congress and the President should take the
opportunity to create a lasting vision for the President’s detention power
in the War on Terror. For too long, the judiciary has been forced to
muddle through the most basic of detention questions — the extent of
the power to detain — before even considering the more intricate details
of habeas proceedings such as which evidence to allow, vitiation of
membership, and the use of the mosaic theory, among others. Although
some in favor of statutory procedural rules for habeas proceedings may
oppose a statement of detention authority for various reasons, TDERRA
would finally clarify the extent of the authority already granted to the
President.
II. HABEAS PROCEDURES
The judges of the D.C. District Court who have been adjudicating
Guantanamo detainees’ habeas petitions have not been shy in asking
76
Congress for assistance in providing clear rules for those proceedings.
74

Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870 n.1.
Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 5 n.4. In criticizing the Al-Bihani decision, Judge
Robertson stated:
The [Al-Bihani] panel concluded that ‘the government’s detention authority
logically covers a category of persons no narrower than is covered by its
military commission authority.’…Where, as here, the government clearly has no
triable criminal case of ‘purposeful and material support’ against Salahi, the
logic of that conclusion escapes me.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
76
See discussion supra note 9.
75
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Of course, many commentators have long advocated for congressional
77
input in these rules as well. Recognizing the potential problems with
Boumediene’s open-ended invitation to trial courts to develop the
78
operative habeas procedures, some in Congress attempted to establish
statutory rules shortly after the decision, making their best guess about
79
which issues would most benefit from congressional guidance. Basic
issues, such as the burden of proof, scope of discovery, protection of
classified information, proceeding logistics, and response to an order of
80
release dominated one early proposal. Since that time, though, much
has happened in the world of detainee litigation. As of December 31,
2009, the courts had ruled on forty-one Guantanamo habeas cases, and
fifty-two detainees had been released post-Boumediene, twenty-one of
81
whom had prevailed in a habeas proceeding. In addition, the MCA09
82
was signed into law, and extensive studies have been done on the
evidentiary and procedural rules emerging from the D.C. District
83
Court. From watching the process play out to this point and seeing the
issues that have divided the district court judges, Congress is now in a
much better position than it was in 2008 to enact rules governing
detainee habeas proceedings.
A. Covered Individuals
The first question to answer when designing procedures to govern
detainee habeas corpus petitions is to whom should the new procedures
apply? Should legislation affect existing habeas petitions? Should the
procedures apply only to current detainees at Guantanamo Bay, or
should they also encompass other detainees, including individuals who
have not yet been captured?
TDERRA applies new habeas procedures to all petitions pending
77

E.g., WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 7; Cole, supra note 8, at 745.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008) (“We make no attempt to anticipate
all of the evidentiary and access-to-counsel issues that will arise during the course of the
detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings….These and the other remaining questions are within
the expertise and competence of the District Court to address in the first instance.”); see
discussion supra note 17.
79
E.g., Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S. 3401, 110th Cong. (2008).
80
Id. § a(2).
81
Huq, supra note 14, at 408.
82
The MCA09 was signed into law on October 28, 2009. Warren Richey, Obama
Endorses Military Commissions for Guantanamo Detainees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct.
29, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/1029/p02s01-usju.html.
83
E.g. WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 18-20.
78
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or filed on or after the date of enactment by individuals who are: 1) held
by the United States at Guantanamo Bay or who the United States seeks
to hold as an unprivileged enemy belligerent and 2) subject to the
84
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. In practice, this would
apply the new procedures to the current detainee population at
Guantanamo Bay, any future detainees housed in Guantanamo Bay or
the United States, and detainees held anywhere else that the courts
extend habeas corpus. Since 2004, we have seen a halt in detainee
85
transfers to Guantanamo Bay, while detainees such as Padilla and alMarri have been transferred to the criminal justice system. Meanwhile,
there have been no individuals held under the law of war in the United
States. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible — and perhaps likely —
that the United States will eventually find itself needing to hold new law
of war detainees, whether at Guantanamo Bay, in the United States, or
elsewhere. Similarly, although the D.C. Circuit Court rejected the
extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction to Bagram, Afghanistan, in Al
86
Maqaleh v. Gates, it is possible that the courts could extend
extraterritorial habeas jurisdiction beyond Guantanamo in the future. In
either case, TDERRA is designed with a backstop, so that its new
procedures will automatically apply to individuals detained under the
law of war wherever habeas jurisdiction exists. Like TDERRA’s
proposed definition of the class of individuals covered by the
President’s detention power, this provision applying the bill’s habeas
procedures to future detainees held wherever habeas jurisdiction exists
is not meant to institutionalize long-term military detention beyond the
President’s already recognized power. It is merely meant to serve as a
safety valve in case the courts extend habeas jurisdiction beyond its
current geographic scope.
Rather than simply cover those currently and in the future held as
“unprivileged enemy belligerents,” TDERRA expressly mentions the
population at Guantanamo Bay because of the recent change in
nomenclature from “unlawful enemy combatant” to “unprivileged
87
enemy belligerent.” Given that new status determinations for current
84

S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2010).
See Huq, supra note 14, at 405 (“Anecdotal information suggests that inflows to the
base in fact largely dried up in 2004, after the Supreme Court’s first interventions in the
field.”).
86
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
87
See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat.
2190, 2574-2614 (2009); see also Memorandum of Respondents, supra note 27, at 1-3, 7, 8,
85

KUHN (DO NOT DELETE)

240

5/5/2011 7:31 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

Vol. 35:2

detainees have not taken place after the terminology change, the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay are arguably held as “unlawful enemy
combatants,” which was the label given at their status determination, or
“unprivileged enemy belligerents,” if the “unlawful enemy combatant”
determination is seen as fluidly moving to the new label. Because of this
uncertainty, TDERRA explicitly names the Guantanamo Bay detainee
population as covered individuals.
An argument could be made that Congress should not even hint in
a statute that habeas jurisdiction extends further than Guantanamo Bay,
lest the courts decide to interpret that as an invitation to do so. By
applying the habeas procedures to all individuals detained as
unprivileged enemy belligerents wherever habeas jurisdiction extends,
Congress would not specifically mention detainees held in any
particular part of the world, like Bagram. As such, it is unlikely that the
courts would interpret such a provision as an invitation to extend habeas
further than its current bounds. If such a provision was not included and
habeas was extended or detainees were brought to the United States,
different law of war detainees with access to habeas could be subject to
different procedural rules based on their location. The benefit of having
a backstop to prevent that outcome far outweighs the negligible danger
of judges using the provision as a launching point for expanded habeas
jurisdiction.
B. Burden of Proof
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court contemplated a burden shifting
mechanism for determining whether an individual, including an
88
American citizen, was lawfully held. First, the government would have
to present “credible evidence” that the individual met the detention
89
definition. Then, the detainee would have the opportunity to rebut with
90
“more persuasive evidence.” A previous legislative attempt to provide
procedural rules for the habeas proceedings used this burden-shifting
91
structure. Judge Hogan, however, held that the government bears a
11-12.
88

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (“[O]nce the Government puts forth
credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus
could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he
falls outside the criteria.”).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
While embracing the Hamdi burden-shifting framework, the Enemy Combatant
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“preponderance of the evidence” burden in detainee habeas cases, and
93
the rest of the D.C. District Court has followed his lead.
Even the D.C. Circuit decision in Al-Bihani, while discussing the
Hamdi standard and hinting that a “some evidence, reasonable
suspicion, or probable cause” standard of proof may suffice
94
constitutionally, argues that the Hamdi procedure “mirrors a
95
preponderance standard.” As some have argued, that is likely only true
if the “credible evidence” standard at the beginning of the Hamdi
96
burden shifting mechanism is actually a “preponderance” standard. In
Al-Adahi, the D.C. Circuit Court indicated a willingness to reconsider
97
the preponderance standard as the applicable standard of proof. The
court requested supplemental briefs on the issue, and both the detainee
and government agreed that the preponderance standard was
98
appropriate. The government argued that a different standard may be
appropriate in a different case or context, but did not explain why that
99
might be. The court exhibited clear skepticism of the Constitution
100
requiring the preponderance standard, as it examined the evidentiary
standards historically used, among them “some evidence” and “probable

Detention Review Act of 2008 also required habeas courts to make findings of fact by “a
preponderance of the evidence.” E.g. Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S.
3401, 110th Cong. §2(d) (2008).
92
Case Management Order, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442,
2008 WL 4858241 at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008), amended by 2008 WL 5245890 at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Case Management Order] (“The government bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner’s detention is
lawful.”); see Matthew C. Waxman, Guantanamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof:
Viewing the Law through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245, 247-48 (2009)
(describing the back and forth between the government and detainees’ counsel before Judge
Hogan).
93
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 13 (citing Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 2324 (D.D.C. 2009); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Odah v.
Obama, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip op. at 31
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195-96 (D.D.C. 2008)).
94
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
95
Id. at 878.
96
E.g. WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 14.
97
See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
98
Id. at 1104-05.
99
Id. at 1104.
100
The court quoted Boumediene’s statement that the “extent of the showing required of
the Government in these cases is a matter to be determined,” and charged that the district
courts had accepted the preponderance standard without rationale. Id. (quoting Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008)).

KUHN (DO NOT DELETE)

242

5/5/2011 7:31 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

Vol. 35:2

101

cause.” While adopting the preponderance standard because of the
lack of argument in favor of a more deferential standard, the court
102
signaled to the government that a lesser standard may be permissible.
One wonders if, when confronted with the opportunity to argue for a
lesser standard, the government decided that it would be better to adopt
the preponderance standard than risk an appeal to the Supreme Court on
the issue.
Despite the hints in Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi that a lower
evidentiary standard may be available, at this point, the district court
judges have accepted the “preponderance” standard for the purposes of
detainee habeas proceedings. Congress and the President would be wise
to accept this as the standard because 1) it is unclear, as discussed in AlBihani, whether a lower standard of proof would be constitutionally
103
permissible, and 2) it would likely be politically impossible to
statutorily create a lower standard for detention than the one currently
being used, as many in Congress would not countenance a retreat from a
standard of proof that has been uniformly accepted by the habeas courts.
C. Evidentiary Presumptions
In keeping with Hamdi’s burden-shifting vision of habeas
proceedings, the government has repeatedly requested a presumption in
favor of its evidence, as to both the authenticity and accuracy of the
104
evidence. While some habeas judges have granted a presumption in
favor of the authenticity of the government’s evidence, they have not
accepted a presumption in favor of the accuracy of the government’s
105
evidence. Doing so would counteract the standard of proof that the
judges have accepted — a burden on the government to prove its case
106
by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Just as TDERRA accepts the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard that the judges have installed,
101
The court found that habeas proceedings contesting deportation and selective service
decision used a “some evidence” standard, while proceedings contesting arrest used a
“probable cause” standard. Id.
102
Id. at 1105 (“Although we doubt…that the Suspension Clause requires the use of the
preponderance standard…we will assume arguendo that the government must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that Al-Adahi was part of al-Qaida.”).
103
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
104
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 32.
105
Id. at 34 (citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim
v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip. op. at 13 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2009)).
106
Id.
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it also provides for a presumption in favor of the authenticity of the
107
government’s evidence, but not for the evidence’s accuracy.
D. Mosaic Theory
The “mosaic theory” of evidence demonstrates the tension between
intelligence gathering for the purposes of the executive branch and
evidence gathering for the purpose of satisfying a judicial burden of
proof. Under the mosaic theory, the “mosaic” of disparate pieces of
information may in aggregate prove more than the sum of the individual
108
pieces of evidence. Stated differently, it is a “rough analogue for the
109
use in courts of circumstantial evidence,” and “the evidence meshes
110
together to demonstrate” detainability. For example, in a case in which
an individual lodged with an enemy group and associated with known
members of that group for an extended period of time, the government
might argue that the evidence viewed as a whole shows that the
individual falls under the executive’s detention authority.
Given that the intelligence community commonly uses the mosaic
111
theory to analyze information, and information from the intelligence
community is used by the government to satisfy the burden of proof in
detainee habeas cases, a rejection of the mosaic theory by the judiciary
could hamstring the administration. In some cases, the D.C. District
Court has rejected the mosaic approach and the government’s argument
112
in favor of examining the “evidence as a whole.” While recognizing
the difference between evidence that the intelligence community and the
113
courts might find satisfactory, in some cases the district court has
107
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(1)(D) (2010). But see Enemy Combatant Detention
Review Act of 2008, S. 3401, 110th Cong. § 2(d) (2008) (providing a presumption in favor
of both the accuracy and authenticity of the government’s evidence, and also adopting the
Hamdi burden shifting framework, rather than a straight “preponderance of the evidence”
standard).
108
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (quoting David Pozen, Note, The Mosaic
Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630
(2005)).
109
Id.
110
Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2009).
111
Id. at 56 (“[U]se of the mosaic approach is a common and well-established mode of
analysis in the intelligence community.”).
112
Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (D.D.C. 2009).
113
Ali Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (“The kind and amount of evidence which satisfies
the intelligence community in reaching final conclusions about the value of information it
obtains may be very different, and certainly cannot govern the Court’s ruling.”).
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indicated that evidence must “be carefully analyzed-major-issue-indispute by major-issue-in-dispute-since the whole cannot stand if its
114
supporting components cannot survive scrutiny.” The D.C. Circuit
Court harshly criticized the district court’s decision to analyze each
piece of evidence individually without considering their inter115
relationship. While not describing use of the mosaic theory as such,
the D.C. Circuit Court stressed that the evidence should be considered
116
as a whole, rather than as individual pieces standing alone.
Statutorily enforcing use of the mosaic approach in detainee habeas
cases is difficult at best and impossible at worst. Judges will decide for
themselves the weight of particular evidence and whether the
government has proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence. At
a minimum, however, Congress should provide that district courts
should consider the “totality of the circumstances” and the “evidence as
a whole” in determining whether the government has met its burden.
Hamdi and Boumediene both encourage habeas courts to consider the
117
special circumstances of these cases in devising the procedural rules.
When the government collects information on individuals involved in
these cases, it is usually with an eye toward analysis by the intelligence
118
community rather than the judiciary. Congress and the President
should be cognizant of the different modes of analysis that are utilized
by the intelligence community and judiciary, and TDERRA attempts to
bridge that gap by directing district courts to consider the evidence as a
whole when determining whether the government satisfied its burden of
119
proof.

114

Mohammed, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
116
Id.
117
E.g. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795-96 (2008) (“Certain accommodations
can be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will place on the military
without impermissibly diluting the protections of the writ.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 533 (2004) (“[T]he exigencies of the circumstances may demand that…enemycombatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”).
118
As Professor Waxman argues, while questioned by some courts, mosaic evidence is
used in a variety of other very important contexts, including informing life and death
decisions. See Waxman, supra note 92, at 260-61 (“[I]t is sometimes those same
‘intelligence purposes’ viewed skeptically by the courts upon which the executive relies in
making decisions of enormous military and humanitarian or liberty consequences. These
include detention decisions in Afghanistan….[and] the application of lethal force.”).
119
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(1)(D) (2010).
115
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E. Presumptions Related to Membership
The issue of vitiation is most vividly demonstrated in Salahi. In
that post-Al-Bihani case, the detainee was alleged, among other actions,
to have recruited two of the 9/11 hijackers and a coordinator of the plot
120
to Al Qaeda. While denying that he was a recruiter for the
organization, Salahi conceded that he swore bayat to Al Qaeda and
121
waged jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Salahi argued
that his association with Al Qaeda ended after 1992, well before his
122
capture by the United States in 2001.
In considering the habeas petition, Judge Robertson rejected the
government’s argument that Salahi was covered under the “purposeful
and material support” prong of the detention definition because any
support he provided to Al Qaeda was sporadic, not occurring at the time
of his capture, and not in furtherance of hostilities against the United
123
States or its coalition partners. Judge Robertson determined that he
would consider Salahi’s support in determining whether he was “part
of” Al Qaeda, applying Judge Bates’ test from Hamlily v. Obama,
namely, “whether the individual functions or participates within or
under the command structure of the organization — i.e., whether he
124
receives and executes orders or directions.” Salahi goes on to state
that an individual may be “part of” an enemy organization even if he
125
never fights for it. Even a cook may be “part of” an enemy
126
organization if he received and executed orders. Further, Salahi
recognized that under Al-Bihani, a sympathizer outside of the command
structure may be “part of” the organization without having “[t]aken
127
direct part in the hostilities.”
The crux of the issue in Salahi, though, is determining when an
individual must be a “part of” an enemy organization to be detainable,
as it was undisputed that Salahi was a sworn member of Al Qaeda in the
120

Salahi v. Obama, 710 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
121
Id. at 4, 9-10.
122
Id. at 10.
123
Id. at 4-5.
124
Id. at 5 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009); Awad v.
Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009)).
125
Id. at 4-5 (citing Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
126
Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (citing Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 n.19
(D.D.C. 2009)).
127
Id.
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128

early 1990s. Judge Robertson determined that it was not sufficient to
prove that an individual was a member of an enemy group at some
129
point. Instead, the government bore the burden of proving that Salahi
was “part of” Al Qaeda at the time of capture — November 2001, in
130
Salahi’s case. Judge Robertson explicitly rejected the government’s
argument that once it proves that a detainee was a member of an enemy
group at some point in the past, the burden shifts to the individual to
131
prove affirmative acts of disassociation from that group. Instead,
Salahi stands for the proposition that the government must prove that a
detainee was “part of” an enemy group at the time of capture, and even
if the individual was clearly “part of” the group at an earlier point, he
need not prove overt acts of disassociation.
In sum, Salahi granted release to an individual who had — at least
at one point in time — sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda, fought for the
organization in Afghanistan, allegedly recruited participants in the 9/11
132
attacks (Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah), and
who was connected to Mohamed Atta by the 9/11 Commission
133
Report. This release was based on a finding that the United States
government could not prove his detainability on the date of capture. The
D.C. Circuit Court ultimately vacated and remanded Salahi because the
district court treated its inquiry into whether Salahi received and
executed orders as dispositive as to whether he was a “part of” Al
134
Qaeda. Salahi conflicted with the D.C. Circuit’s later decisions in
Bensayah v. Obama and Awad v. Obama, which clarified that the
determination of whether an individual is “part of” an enemy
organization “must be made on a case-by-case basis” and participation
in a group’s command structure is sufficient but not necessary for such
135
a conclusion. The appellate court did not, however, object to Judge
128

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5-6.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 6 n.7 (“I have rejected the government’s broadest assertion, that Salahi’s
concession of al-Qaida membership in the early 1990’s shifted the burden of proof,
requiring that he prove affirmative acts of dis-association to show that he was not a member
in 2001.”).
132
Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
133
NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 165-66 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
134
Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
135
Id. at 752-53 (quoting Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
129
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Robertson’s refusal to shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
136
prove vitiation.
Even before Salahi, habeas judges took differing approaches to the
vitiation issue. Four judges ruled that the government may not detain
someone whose relationship with an enemy group ended before
137
capture. The test employed by the judges considered the nature of the
relationship in the first instance, the nature of intervening events or
conduct, and the amount of time that elapsed between the relationship
138
and initial custody. Judge Hueville held that a detainee may even
vitiate his relationship with an enemy group after capture, and that in
that circumstance, a habeas court should consider the detainee’s
139
likelihood of rejoining the enemy. The idea that a detainee can —
while detained — reform, terminate his relationship with an enemy
group, and separate himself from his pre-capture activity such that he
would no longer be detainable, would almost certainly be rejected by
the political branches. While political leaders viewing the habeas
process from the outside may see an obvious answer to such issues,
without statutory guidance, it should come as no surprise that district
court judges come to varied conclusions.
Ironically, the same judge who authored the Salahi opinion, Judge
Robertson, previously held that an individual’s detainability turned not
on future dangerousness, but on whether the individual was a member
140
of an enemy group for some period of time. In that case, Judge
Robertson did not confront the vitiation issue, but he hinted that even
pre-capture vitiation may not remove an individual from the
141
government’s detention power. This decision, of course, stands in
136

The Court of Appeals recognized that shifting the burden to detainees to show
vitiation “may be warranted in some cases,” but determined that Salahi’s 1991 membership
in Al Qaeda was “insufficiently probative of his relationship with al-Qaida at the time of his
capture in November 2001 to justify shifting the burden.” Id. at 751.
137
Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2009); Khan v. Obama, 646
F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip op. at 18 (D.D.C. Dec. 15,
2009); Al Adahi, No. 05-0280, slip op. at 40-42 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009).
138
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 26 (citing Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 130; Hatim,
No. 05-1429, slip op. at 18; Al Adahi, No. 05-0280, slip op. at 40-42).
139
See Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he AUMF
does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent
those individuals from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize
detention where its purpose can no longer be attained.”).
140
Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
141
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 31.
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stark contrast to Judge Robertson’s opinion in Salahi, which held not
only that pre-capture vitiation is a valid basis for determining that a
individual is not detainable, but also that a detainee need not
affirmatively prove acts of vitiation, despite ample evidence that a
142
strong prior association with an enemy group existed. As Salahi and
Awad show, without statutory guidance, the same judge may come to
differing conclusions on these difficult detention issues in different
cases, let alone the variety of opinions that may exist among different
judges.
After Salahi, Judge Robertson expounded upon his vitiation rule in
143
Khalifh v. Obama. While denying the habeas petition of a detainee he
determined to be “part of” Al Qaeda on several evidentiary bases, Judge
Robertson stated that a petitioner who was once a member of an enemy
group can prove vitiation by showing that he took affirmative steps to
144
abandon his membership. Citing Salahi, the court also declared that a
petitioner can show a lapse of membership without an affirmative act of
severance if the evidence that the membership lapsed is “credible and
145
significant.” The court notes, however, that the proposition of vitiation
without proof of an affirmative act of separation rests on the unusual
facts of Salahi — “a gap of nearly a decade between [Salahi’s] activity
146
in and his subsequent capture.” This indicates that a finding of
vitiation absent proof of affirmative acts of disassociation will be an
exception to the rule on vitiation, rather than the rule itself.
TDERRA confronts the vitiation issue by providing that once the
government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a
detainee was an unprivileged enemy belligerent at a particular time
147
before capture, there is a rebuttable presumption that the detainee
148
remained an unprivileged enemy belligerent at the time of capture. To
rebut the presumption, a detainee would be required to show that he
149
withdrew from the organization prior to capture. Habeas courts would
142

Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 n.7 (D.D.C. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 745
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
143
Khalifh v. Obama, No. 05-CV-1189, 2010 WL 2382925, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28,
2010).
144
Id.
145
Id. (citing Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 6 n.7).
146
Id.
147
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii) (2010).
148
Id. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii)(I).
149
Id. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii)(II).
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reject any argument that a detainee withdrew from an enemy
150
organization after capture.
This provision would solve the Salahi problem by requiring
detainees to affirmatively prove that they withdrew from an enemy
organization. Courts should not allow the absence of evidence of
membership at the time of capture to eclipse substantial evidence from
prior membership. While individuals must be allowed to prove that they
reformed from prior associations with enemy groups, the government is
entitled to some deference in using evidence of prior membership to
prove detainability at the time of capture. This type of burden-shifting
mechanism strikes the appropriate balance in proving membership in an
enemy group at the time of capture.
With regard to consideration of post-capture vitiation in habeas
proceedings, some may argue that a detainee should be able to contend
that he has sufficiently separated himself from an enemy group such
that rejoining the battle is unlikely. Like a common criminal presenting
to a parole board, as the argument goes, detainees should be able to
attempt to persuade a habeas judge that he has reformed and will not
recidivate. Habeas proceedings are inquiries into the lawfulness of
detention, though, and whether a detainee has reformed postapprehension is immaterial to that consideration. Also, unlike common
criminals pleading that they will not act unlawfully again, members of
enemy groups are attached by ideology, in addition to actions.
Regardless, post-apprehension vitiation is irrelevant to the question of
whether detention is lawful. The proper venue for such an argument
would be an administrative review board inquiring whether a detainee
151
continues to pose a threat to the national security of the United States.
Building off Al-Bihani’s reasoning that a non-citizen captured
abroad who trained at enemy camps would almost certainly be
152
detainable, TDERRA also provides that upon a showing that an
individual knowingly obtained training from an enemy group, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the individual is an “unprivileged enemy

150

Id. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii)(III).
See infra text accompanying note 242.
152
See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[E]vidence
supporting the military’s reasonable belief of either [attending Al Qaeda training camps or
visiting Al Qaeda guesthouses] with respect to a non-citizen seized abroad during the
ongoing war on terror would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively, justify the
government’s detention …”).
151
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153

belligerent.” This would settle the question of whether training with
the enemy is alone sufficient to render an individual detainable. Habeas
judges struggled with this issue before Al-Bihani’s clear suggestion
(explicitly affirmed in Al-Adahi) that training with the enemy is
sufficient to bring a person under the detention power. For example,
Judge Bates and others have considered training (and other support)
only in terms of determining whether an individual was “part of” an
154
enemy organization. Similarly, Judge Urbina has required the
government to prove that an individual participated in the command
structure of an enemy organization, with proof of training alone being
155
insufficient to prove the ability to detain. While the recent rulings in
Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi may have clarified this issue for the district
courts, Congress and the President should take the opportunity to affirm
the view in those cases that training at an enemy camp alone is
sufficient to trigger the executive’s detention authority.
F. Discovery and Classified Information Protection
The extent of discovery rights and treatment of classified
information in detainee habeas cases are of special national security and
156
political importance. If Congress and the President reform the
applicable habeas procedures, defining the extent of discovery and
bolstering the protection of classified information are two critical
national security issues that must be proactively addressed.
Comprehensive reform should address discovery and classified
information procedures to mitigate the potential for damaging leaks,
prevent the possibility of a judge allowing open-ended fishing
expeditions into sensitive government information, and take the
contentious political issue off the table.
The Bismullah v. Gates decision interpreting the discovery
153

S. 3707, § 2(e)(1)(E)(i).
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 19 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63,
75 (D.D.C. 2009); Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2009); Awad v. Obama,
646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85
(D.D.C. 2009); Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009)).
155
Id. at 19 (citing Hatim v. Obama, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009)).
156
See Attorney Gen. Michael Mukasey, Remarks Prepared Before the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008) available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-0807213.html (“For the sake of
national security, we cannot turn habeas corpus proceedings into a smorgasbord of classified
information for our enemies.”).
154
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obligations in the review process of the DTA provides the most vivid
example of the legal and political imperativeness of addressing
discovery and classified information protection in legislation reforming
157
habeas procedures. Under the DTA, the D.C. Circuit Court had
158
jurisdiction for a limited review of detainee status determinations. In
Bismullah, a D.C. Circuit Court panel held that in the DTA review
process, the government’s production of information from the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (hereinafter “CSRTs”) was
159
insufficient for “meaningful” review. Instead, the court required the
Department of Defense and other government agencies to produce a
160
wide array of information about detainees, leading to fears of sensitive
classified information leaks, fishing expeditions into government files
by detainee lawyers, and a debilitating logistical challenge for the
161
Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies. Ultimately, of
162
course, DTA review was eclipsed by the habeas right in Boumediene,
and classified information problems have been relatively inconspicuous
in the habeas process. Nevertheless, detainees have cited Bismullah for
the proposition that the government must search all “reasonably
available” information and disclose more than is required under habeas
163
case management orders. As Bismullah was based on a now-defunct
157

Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated, 554 U.S. 913 (2008).
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2741-44 (2005).
159
Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 180.
160
The court stated:
[T]he record on review consists of all the information a [CSRT] is authorized to
obtain and consider… ‘such reasonably available information in the possession
of the U.S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets the
criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant,’ which includes any
information presented to the Tribunal by the detainee or his Personal
Representative.
Id.
161
See Lyle Denniston, Government Duty in Detainee Cases Narrowed, SCOTUSBLOG,
(Oct. 3, 2007, 6:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/10/government-duty-in-detaineecases-narrowed/ (describing the government’s reaction to the Bismullah decision as
“strongly worded statements by all top-echelon intelligence officials, warn[ing] that the July
20 decision would impose a mountainous burden on the government to gather all
information in any agency’s hands about detainees — a task which would divert officials
from such critical tasks as waging the ‘war on terrorism.’”).
162
But see Huq, supra note 14, at 10 (arguing that Detainee Treatment Act review after
Bismullah was so broad that Boumediene “was only a change in the kind of judicial
oversight, not an absolute shift in its availability.”).
163
E.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
158
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review system under the DTA, such claims made by detainees have
164
failed. If Congress is to broadly reform the habeas procedures, though,
it must concomitantly shore up the discovery and classified information
procedures. This is necessary to ensure the protection of our national
security interests, and avoid the possible firestorm of another
Bismullah-type decision.
The case management order governing most detainee habeas
proceedings compels the government to disclose “all reasonably
available evidence in its possession that tends materially to undermine
the information presented to support the government’s justification for
165
detaining the petitioner.” “Reasonably available evidence” means
“evidence contained in any information reviewed by attorneys preparing
factual returns for all detainees,” as well as “any other evidence the
government discovers while litigating habeas corpus petitions filed by
166
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.” In addition, if requested by the
167
detainee, the government must disclose:
1. any documents and objects in the government’s possession that the
government relies on to justify detention;
2. all statements, in whatever form, made or adopted by the
petitioner that the government relies on to justify detention; and
3. information about the circumstances in which such statements of
168
the petitioner were made or adopted.”

TDERRA defines detainees’ discovery rights as the ability to
review:
i) any documents or objects directly and specifically referenced in
the return submitted by the Government;
ii) any evidence known to the attorney for the Government that tends
materially to undermine evidence presented in the return submitted
by the Government; and

164

Id.
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 5245890, at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008); Case Management Order, supra note 92, at *1.
166
In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, 2008 WL 5245890, at *1.
167
Discovery requests must be:
(1) be narrowly tailored, not open-ended; (2) specify the discovery sought; (3)
explain why the request, if granted, is likely to produce evidence that
demonstrates that the petitioner’s detention is unlawful; and (4) explain why the
requested discovery will enable the petitioner to rebut the factual basis for his
detention without unfairly disrupting or unduly burdening the government.
Case Management Order, supra note 92, at *2.
168
Id. at *2.
165
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iii) all statements, whether oral, written, or recorded, made or
adopted by the covered individual that are known to the attorney for
the Government and directly related to the information in the return
169
submitted by the Government.

The two filters of this discovery obligation are: 1) whether the
attorney for the government, rather than anyone in the government,
knows of its existence, and 2) the information sought by the detainee
must relate to the information in the government’s return.
The first filter in this discovery formulation prevents the sort of
open-ended obligation contemplated by Bismullah on the part of the
government’s agencies and actors to exhaustively sort through all of its
170
information on a particular detainee. If the attorney for the
government is not aware of a particular piece of information, but a lowlevel intelligence analyst is, the government is not required to produce
the information. More important perhaps than preventing the production
of the information in that situation is that the government is not
obligated to determine whether the low-level intelligence analyst knows
of the information. It is that type of exhaustive search for information
that the government argued would be debilitating after Bismullah.
The second filter is that the information sought by the detainee
must relate to the information in the government’s return. Like the first
filter, this requirement removes the government’s obligation to
exhaustively sort through all of its information, which could be spread
throughout different agencies, on a particular detainee. In creating its
return, the government could limit its discovery obligation to known
and related information. This certainty would protect sensitive
information, speed the process to the benefit of both the government
and the detainee, and be contrary to the much criticized mandate in
Bismullah.
TDERRA’s provisions concerning the protection of classified
information strive to: 1) protect classified information from all
disclosure to unprivileged enemy belligerents, 2) provide the petitioner
or his cleared attorney with access to the information necessary to
169

S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(2)(A) (2010).
In its later denial of the government’s motion for rehearing, the D.C. Circuit held
that the government’s disclosure obligation was not as broad as the government feared, but
only to the information that was “reasonably available.” But see Bismullah v. Gates, 503
F.3d 137, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The Government, it seems is overreading Bishmullah I . . .
. A search for information without regard to whether it is ‘reasonably available’ is clearly
not required by Bismullah I.”).
170

KUHN (DO NOT DELETE)

254

5/5/2011 7:31 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

Vol. 35:2

present their case, either in unclassified substitute or original classified
form, respectively, 3) safeguard classified sources and methods of
intelligence gathering, 4) allow ex parte and in camera review of a
government motion to protect certain classified information, and 5)
allow the government the right to interlocutory appeal of a decision
relating of the trial court relating to the disclosure of classified
171
information. These goals are largely the same as those of the case
172
management order currently governing most detainee habeas petitions.
For national security reasons, the protection of classified information
must be absolutely paramount in these proceedings. Detainees should be
provided relevant, unclassified information to the extent that doing so is
consistent with protecting national security. Detainees’ cleared counsel
should be privy to appropriate classified information necessary to make
his or her client’s case. However, proponents can bolster their argument
for reform by ensuring that classified sources and methods are protected
from disclosure, enemy belligerents are not provided with any classified
173
information, and the government retains procedural options as a
backstop against the inappropriate disclosure of classified information.
Indeed, without strong classified information provisions, comprehensive
reform would almost certainly not become law.
G. Witness Production
One persistent fear of Boumediene critics was that United States
soldiers and intelligence officers would be called off the battlefield to
174
testify in habeas proceedings for Guantanamo detainees. In practice,
the petitions have been primarily adjudicated on the basis of written
175
submissions. Like the proposed classified information section,
171

S. 3707, § 2(e)(2)(B).
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 5245890, at *2
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008);
173
Those concerned about the disclosure of classified information in detainee habeas
cases often cite the 1995 prosecution of Omar Abdel Rahman, when the unindicted coconspirators list made its way to Osama Bin Laden. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 829-30 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174
Id. (“One escalation of procedures that the Court is clear about is affording the
detainees increased access to witnesses (perhaps troops serving in Afghanistan?) and to
classified information.”).
175
But see Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Major Fight Brews on Munaf, SCOTUSBLOG,
(July 1, 2010, 8:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/07/analysis-major-fight-brewson-munaf/ (discussing Mohammed, a case in which Judge Kessler ordered “the top U.S.
diplomat in charge of detainee transfers to other countries” to testify regarding a proposed
172
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addressing the potential for soldiers and intelligence officers to be
called off the battlefield to testify is critical for national security
reasons. TDERRA explicitly provides that to the maximum extent
possible, detainee habeas petitions will be adjudicated on the basis of
the written returns and declarations, and the Federal Rules of Civil
176
Procedure and their civil counterpart do not control. Further, the
district court may only require oral testimony if it “finds by clear and
convincing evidence that military and intelligence operations would not
be harmed by the production of the witness and oral testimony would be
177
likely to provide a material benefitFalse” These provisions should
allay fears that adjudicating detainee habeas claims will harm military
and intelligence operations and clarify for judges the evidentiary basis
upon which to make findings.
H. Hearsay
The Supreme Court expressly invited the use of hearsay evidence
178
in Hamdi. Before Al-Bihani, habeas judges agreed that hearsay needed
to be reliable to factor into the court’s analysis, but disagreed on
whether the evidence’s reliability is a threshold matter of admissibility,
179
or simply relevant to the weight to be given the evidence. The D.C.
Circuit Court settled this issue in Al-Bihani by holding that all hearsay
is admissible, and reliability is relevant only to the weight to be given to
180
the evidence. In doing so, Al-Bihani noted that an inquiry into the
reliability of hearsay evidence, rather than its admissibility, comports
with the requirements of Hamdi and the fact that district court judges
181
are sophisticated finders of fact. TDERRA embraces this holding by
providing that in detainee habeas proceedings the district court may
review all probative evidence, including hearsay, and an inquiry into the
reliability of hearsay evidence is only relevant to the probative weight
transfer, and the D.C. Circuit Court barred Judge Kessler from requiring such testimony.).
176
S. 3707, § 2(e)(3)(A).
177
Id. § 2(e)(3)(B).
178
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (“Hearsay, for example, may need
to be accepted as the most reliable evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.”).
179
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 35.
180
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he question a habeas
court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible—it is always
admissible— but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it
exhibits.”).
181
Id. at 880.
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182

I. Coerced Statements
One criticism of the military commissions established by the
MCA06 was that some evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment could be admitted if they had sufficient reliability
183
and probative value. The MCA06 did not completely exclude this type
184
of statement from consideration. It is possible that a military judge
would not have allowed such evidence to be admitted, but the
185
government would not rule out its use. The issue was eventually
186
resolved by a statutory change in the MCA09, but not before it
festered and persuaded some that military commissions in general were
illegitimate proceedings. The decision by the government not to rule out
using evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
not only damaged the military commissions authorized by the MCA06,
but also fostered misperceptions and mistrust about the reformed
commissions authorized by the MCA09. Even after passage of the
MCA09, critics misunderstand the constitutional requirements for the
commissions and assail the provisions related to voluntariness and
182

S. 3707, § 2(e)(3)(A). Contra Cole, supra note 8, at 743 (“[H]earsay should be
admitted only where it is ‘the most reliable available evidence’ and its use does not defeat
the detainee’s meaningful opportunity to defend himself.”).
183
Senator Feingold expressed this criticism during a congressional debate:
According to the legislation, statements obtained through cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment, as long as it was obtained prior to December 2005, when
the McCain amendment became law, would apparently be admissible in many
instances in these military commissions. Now, it is true that the bill would
require the commission to find these statements have sufficient and probative
value. But why would we go down this road of trying to convict people based
on statements obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation
techniques? Either we are a nation that stands against this type of cruelty and for
the rule of law or we are not. We cannot have it both ways.
109 CONG. REC. S10,360 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
184
While barring the admission of statements obtained by torture, the MCA06 created a
bifurcated system for admission of other statements, where statements obtained after
enactment of the DTA were barred if resulting from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2580
(2009).
185
See The Legal Rights of Guantanamo Detainees: What Are They, Should They Be
Changed, and Is an End in Sight?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and
Homeland Sec., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 11-12 (2007) (statement of Gen.
Thomas W. Hartmann).
186
§1802, 123 Stat. at 2580.
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coerced testimony, as well as the legitimacy of military commissions in
187
general.
TDERRA adopts the express exclusion of statements obtained
through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the
188
MCA09. As previously discussed, the potential use of such statements
was a longstanding criticism of military commissions before the
MCA09. In any comprehensive reform, legislation adopting rules
favorable to the government, Congress and the President would be wise
to expressly prohibit the use of such statements to prevent similar
complaints.
J. Voluntariness
Like many other issues, habeas judges have applied multiple tests
to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary (and thus, admissible
189
and inadmissible) statements. All judges agree that being in long-term
detention without access to counsel does not in-and-of-itself render
190
statements inadmissible. They also agree that prior abuse can taint
subsequent statements and that the “totality of the circumstances”
191
controls whether a statement is voluntary and admissible. Judges
differ, though, on what is to be considered in the “totality of the
192
circumstances” test. While the passage of time and the question of
whether the circumstances of interrogation have changed are common
inquiries in the “totality of circumstances” test; other factors such as
interrogators’ knowledge of prior statements made pursuant to abuse,
187
E.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, House Passes Changes To
Guantanamo Military Comm’ns (Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/house-passes-changes-guantanamo-military-commissions. The American Civil
Liberties Union is one such critic:
The [MCA09] revises the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to remove some of
its worst violations of due process, but the legislation still falls far short of the
requirements imposed by the Constitution and Geneva Conventions.… [I]t does
not completely bar all coerced testimony as required by the Constitution….
[T]he military commissions, even as reconstituted, are inherently illegitimate
and should be shut down for good…. Because of their tainted history, these
proceedings, if carried on in any form, would continue to be stigmatized as
unfair and inadequate, would be plagued by delay and controversy.
Id.
188
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(4)(A) (2010).
189
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 51.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 52.
192
Id.
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193

have also been considered. One judge has required compliance with
the Army Field Manual and Geneva Conventions for statements to be
194
admissible, and another has questioned the reliability of statements
merely made at a site where abuse was taking place, regardless of
195
whether the abuse involved the detainee in question.
The MCA09 allows the admission of detainee statements upon a
finding that “the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during
military operations at the point of capture or during closely related
active combat engagement, and the interests of justice would best be
served by admission of the statement” or “the statement was voluntarily
196
given.” The first avenue of admission — a finding that a statement
was made incident to lawful conduct at the point of capture or soon
thereafter — was created in recognition of the fact that military
activities are inherently coercive to some degree, and statements given
on the battlefield deserve special dispensation when considering
voluntariness.
If the first avenue does not apply, the commission will consider:
1. The details of the taking of the statement, accounting for the
circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence operations
during hostilities.
2. The characteristics of the accused, such as military training, age,
and education level.
3. The lapse of time, change of place, or change in identity of the
questioners between the statement sought to be admitted and any
197
prior questioning of the accused.

Again, these considerations direct a commission considering
voluntariness to be especially cognizant of the difficulty and reality of
military and intelligence operations in a time of war. Considering the
characteristics of the accused allows the commission to give special
scrutiny to statements like those of Omar Khadr, who was a minor when
198
he was captured by the United States. Finally, the direction concerning
193

Id. at 55.
Id. at 56 (citing Al Rabiah v. U.S., 658 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2009)).
195
WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 58 (citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58
(D.D.C. 2009)).
196
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190,
2580 (2009).
197
Id.
198
See Peter Finn, Former Boy Soldier, Youngest Guantanamo Detainee, Heads
Toward Military Tribunal, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020904020.html.
194
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the lapse of time, change in place, and change in identity of the
questioners between interrogations relates to the idea of tainted
interrogation statements. For example, if an abusive interrogation that
elicited a statement was followed shortly by a lawful interrogation
informed by the statement gleaned through abuse, the commission
should consider that string of events in determining the voluntariness of
a statement given in the second interrogation. Likewise, detainee
arguments that a particular statement was involuntary should be
considered in the context of prior events. Even if an abusive
interrogation occurred, if a subsequent statement occurred after a long
lapse in time, in a different place, with different questioners, and
uninformed by statements made in the previous, abusive interrogation,
that statement should likely be admitted.
199
TDERRA adopts the voluntariness standard of the MCA09
because it 1) represents a reasoned attempt to deal with the difficulties
of voluntariness inquiries in the context of active military operations
and 2) was vetted and cleared by both Congress and the President after
extensive discussions, making passage and signing much easier than the
creation of a new standard. Inevitably, a new standard would cause
political questions about how it would treat particular statements
differently than the MCA09 test. More importantly, though, there is no
substantive reason to deviate from the MCA09 standard at this point.
The standard passed in the MCA09 represents Congress’ and the
President’s reasoning on the subject as of 2009, and no problems have
emerged in the military commissions as of the writing of this article that
would recommend altering that test.
K. Particular Statements Against Interest
In addition to the general test for determining the voluntariness of
particular statements, TDERRA provides a presumption in favor of the
voluntariness and reliability of statements against interest given before
CSRTs, Administrative Review Boards (hereinafter “ARBs”), and in
200
compliance with the Army Field Manual (hereinafter “AFM”). These
bright lines will help habeas judges sort through the tangle of statements
to determine which should be admissible and which should not.
CSRTs were designed as a “formal review of all the information

199
200

S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(4)(B)-(C) (2010).
Id. § 2(e)(4)(D).
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related to a detainee to determine whether each person meets the criteria
201
to be designated as an enemy combatant.” Military officers presided at
the CSRTs, and the detainee had a personal representative to view
classified information and assist him in presenting “reasonably
202
available” information to the tribunal, but not act as an advocate. The
government was required to present all of its evidence relevant to the
detainee’s combatant status, including evidence that tended to negate
the detainee’s status as a combatant, and the tribunal made its
203
determination by a preponderance of the evidence. The tribunals were
modeled on Army regulation 190-8, which concerns military tribunals
used to make determinations in compliance with Article 5 of the Third
Geneva Convention, because Hamdi suggested that “a process based on
existing military regulations . . . might be sufficient to meet due process
204
standards.”
After the one-time CSRT process, ARBs conducted an annual
review of detainees to determine whether each detainee “should be
205
released, transferred or further detained.” Like CSRTs, detainees were
allowed to appear before the military officers who made up the board
and present evidence with the assistance of a personal
206
representative. The determinations of ARBs were “based primarily on
207
threat assessment and intelligence value of each detainee.”
The relatively formal CSRT and ARB processes provided
detainees an opportunity to state their case before a decision-making
body with no fear of coercion. Given the incentive for detainees to be
forthcoming and honest with the CSRTs and ARBs, and the boards’
goal to either determine combatant status or make a dispensation
201
Guantanamo Detainee Processes, DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 7, 2007),
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf.
202
JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R22173, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO
BAY 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22173.pdf.
203
Id.
204
Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, U.S. Dep’t of Def. News Briefing: Special
Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunals (March 29, 2005), available at
http://www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2005_03/alia/a5033003.htm.
205
Press Release, Dep’t of Def., Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative Review
Board Decisions Completed (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases
/release.aspx?releaseid=9302. The Obama administration’s March 2011 executive order
creates a similar review process for Guantanamo detainees, but with file reviews occurring
every six months and full reviews every three years. Press Release, The White House, supra
note 7.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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decision, detainee statements against interest before these bodies should
be entitled to a presumption of voluntariness and reliability.
With regard to statements made in compliance with the AFM,
one habeas judge has declared unreliable all evidence resulting from
208
interrogations not in compliance with the AFM. This goes too far, as
statements that are not taken in compliance with the AFM should be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The ruling speaks, however, to the
important difference between AFM and non-AFM statements. For better
or worse, the AFM is now the gold standard for American
209
interrogation, and statements taken in compliance with it should be
considered free of the possible taint of coercion. Thus, statements
against interest given in compliance with the AFM should be entitled to
a presumption in favor of their voluntariness and reliability.
L. Habeas for Detainees Tried or Convicted by Military
Commission or Subject to Executive Transfer Efforts
TDERRA includes a stay of habeas applications for detainees for
whom charges have been sworn or those who have been convicted
210
under the MCA09. The goal is to allow military commission
proceedings to continue without parallel litigation in habeas
proceedings. On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued the
executive order directing the Attorney General to conduct a “review of
the status of each individual currently detained at Guantanamo
211
[Bay].” New charges in military commissions were suspended
212
pending the review. As of the date of this article, the suspension has

208
See WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 56 (citing Al Rabiah v. U.S., 658 F. Supp. 2d
11 (D.D.C. 2009)).
209
See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). Executive Order No.
13,491 sets forth the importance of the Army Field Manual:
[A]n individual in the custody or under the effective control of an officer,
employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or detained within a
facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United
States, in any armed conflict, shall not be subjected to any interrogation
technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not
authorized by and listed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3[].
Id.
210
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(f) (2010).
211
Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (creating a task force to
review “the status of each individual currently detained at Guantanamo. . . .”).
212
See Obaydullah v. Obama, 609 F.3d 444 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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been lifted, but no new charges have yet been sworn and referred.
In Obaydullah v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court considered the
appeal of a detainee who was charged before a military commission
with “conspiracy to provide and providing material support for
215
terrorism.” While charged in 2008, no military commission
proceeding had begun as of February 2010, when the D.C. Circuit Court
decided whether to continue a stay issued by the district court pending
216
military commissions proceedings. The court held that when charges
have not yet been referred and the government can provide no evidence
to the court that military commission proceedings are imminent, such
that the possibility of such proceedings is speculative, a stay is not
217
appropriate. The court made clear that a stay may be appropriate “in
anticipation of an imminent military commission proceeding,” but it
218
found that such a situation did not exist in the case at issue.
TDERRA does not seek to institute a stay of habeas petitions
pending military commissions proceedings as a tool to indefinitely
avoid habeas review. Rather, the stay is intended to allow the
government to begin military commission proceedings without the fear
of interference or parallel habeas litigation. Detainees should not be
forced to wait for years while charges are sworn but not acted upon. On
the other hand, the Obama administration should be encouraged to use
the military commissions system it helped create in the MCA09 because
detention pursuant to a war crimes conviction is more certain in terms
of its ending point and proven to a higher standard of proof than law of
war detention. The burden of carrying on habeas litigation
simultaneously with military commission proceedings would be a
disincentive for the use of military commissions because an entire trial
213

Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: New
Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guantnamo-and-detainee-policy (“The Secretary of Defense will issue an order rescinding his
prior suspension on the swearing and referring of new charges in the military
commissions.”).
214
During the suspension on new military commission charges, some guilty pleas were
reached on existing charges. E.g. Ben Fox, Terrorism Suspect Reaches Plea Deal in
Guantanamo Trial, BOS. GLOBE, July 8, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/
nation/articles/2010/07/08/us_reaches_plea_deal_at_guantanamo_military_trial/.
215
Obaydullah, 609 F.3d at 446.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 448.
218
Id. at 449.
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could be undermined by an adverse habeas ruling at any moment. If,
however, the administration is certain that habeas petitions will be
stayed pending military commission trial and sentence, it would be
more likely to try appropriate cases by military commission.
M. Limits on Second or Successive Habeas Applications
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(hereinafter “AEDPA”) limits second or successive habeas petitions by
219
220
state and federal prisoners. TDERRA uses those AEDPA restrictions
as a model for limits on second or successive habeas petitions by
221
covered individuals. The goal, to the extent possible, is to make
detainees’ habeas review a one-shot process, to be followed by a
periodic administrative review process for those individuals whose
detainability is affirmed by the habeas court and who are subject to
long-term detention.
TDERRA requires second and successive habeas claims that
222
were presented in previous petitions to be dismissed. It also requires
the district court to dismiss habeas claims that were not presented in
previous petitions unless there is a prima facie showing that 1) “the
factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence” and 2) “the facts
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found that the
223
covered individual was lawfully detained.” The government could
“take an interlocutory appeal from a decision by the district court to
224
grant consideration of a second or successive habeas petition.”
These restrictions are modeled off of the AEDPA reforms and
would limit the responsibility of the D.C. District Court to adjudicate
habeas claims that had either already been heard or could have
225
previously brought with proper due diligence. The reforms will create
219

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2010).
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(g) (2010).
221
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
106, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
222
S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(g)(1) (2010).
223
Id. § 2(g)(2).
224
Id. § 2(g)(3)(B).
225
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 106.
220
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incentives for detainees and their counsel to ensure that all of their
relevant claims are adjudicated in the first instance, and will help clear
226
the backlog of cases from the D.C. District Court. The Guantanamo
Bay habeas cases have crowded out other litigation on the D.C. District
Court’s docket, as seen by Chief Judge Lamberth’s statement in March
2009 that the court would not try any civil cases during the spring or
227
summer of 2009. While detainee habeas petitions should be
adjudicated fairly and promptly, other pending litigation deserves the
same treatment. AEDPA-style reforms will ensure efficiency in the
adjudication of habeas claims, allow administrative proceedings to
control after initial Article III review of detainability, and streamline the
D.C. District Court’s docket.
N. Prohibition on Release into the United States
Finally, TDERRA clearly prohibits the release of detainees into
228
the United States. Instead of outright release, the bill provides for a
detainee released by a habeas court to be transferred into the custody of
the Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter “DHS”) “for the
purpose of transferring the individual to the country of citizenship of the
229
individual or to another country.” The legislation requires DHS to
house individuals whose habeas petitions are granted separately from
those detained as “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” and to effectuate a
transfer “as expeditiously as possible,” consistent with national security
and the ban on transferring individuals to countries where they will
230
likely be tortured. In addition to alleviating fears that terrorists will be
231
released into America’s neighborhoods, such an outright ban would
also provide clarity for the habeas judges, who are nervous about the

226

Id.
Jordan Weissman, Chief Judge: D.C. District Court Will Postpone Civil Trials to
Handle Gitmo Cases, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 11:50 AM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/03/chief-judge-dc-district-court-will-postpone-civiltrials-to-handle-gitmo-cases.html.
228
S. 3707, § 2(h)(1)(A) (“No court shall order the release of a covered individual into
the United States, its territories, or possessions.”).
229
Id. § 2(h)(2)(A).
230
Id. § 2(h)(2)(B).
231
See House Democrats Leave Gitmo Closing Money out of Bill, USA TODAY, May 4,
2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-05-04-gitmo-congress_N.htm
(quoting Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell as saying, “[t]he American people want
to keep the terrorists at Guantanamo out of their neighborhoods and off of the battlefield.”).
227
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232

possibility of releasing dangerous individuals.
Some may argue that an outright ban on release into the United
States is a solution in search of a problem, as no detainees have been
released into the United States at this point. As of February 16, 2011,
detainees have been quite successful in their habeas petitions and in
gaining release. Up to that point, detainees prevailed in thirty-eight of
233
fifty-one habeas proceedings. Still, though, no detainees have been
released into the United States, and the release orders issued in cases
234
won by detainees have not called for physical release. Instead, they
have generally required the government to engage in “all necessary and
235
appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate” release.
That said, the possibility of a constitutional conflict between the
judiciary and the executive relating to a detainee release into the United
States remains. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Kiyemba v.
236
Obama, which concerned the release of Chinese Uighur detainees. In
that case, the D.C. Circuit Court held that the judiciary does not have
power to order the release of a Guantanamo detainee into the United
237
States. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case back to the
D.C. Circuit Court after all the detainees in question received at least
one offer of resettlement, some of which were accepted, others which
238
were not. In the process, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit
decision holding that the judiciary lacks the power to grant detainees
239
release into the United States. Thus, the legal issue of whether such
240
power exists is still very much alive. One could imagine, for example,
a case in which a habeas court orders the release an individual whom
the Executive views as dangerous. If the Supreme Court denies the
authority of the courts to order release, the detainee in question would
have the right to habeas corpus, but no effective remedy. On the other
hand, if the Supreme Court accepts the authority of courts to order
232

See Lee, supra note 9.
Larkin Reynolds, GTMO Habeas Numbers Update, LAWFARE (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:52
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/02/gtmo-habeas-numbers-update/.
234
See Huq, supra note 14, at 419.
235
Id.
236
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).
237
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
238
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
239
Id.
240
A related issue is what immigration status, if any, released detainees would possess
upon entry into the United States.
233
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release, the executive could be forced to release an individual that the
administration sees as dangerous to Americans. Taken even further,
even if the judiciary has the authority to order release, the Executive
could simply refuse to effectuate the order, leading to a balance of
powers crisis.
To avoid the scenarios outlined above, TDERRA attempts to
provide a measured, reasonable approach to dealing with detainees
ordered released by the courts. That is, upon an order of release, the
detainee in question is separated from those held as unprivileged enemy
241
belligerents and held by DHS pending release. The administration
must attempt to transfer or release the detainee to another country as
soon as possible, while protecting national security. Habeas judges
would no longer fear the potential negative national security impact of
their decision in favor of a detainee, and the executive would have time
to wind down detention in a reasonable manner.
Another potential criticism of a broad statement against release
into the United States is that it does not make an exception for
American citizen detainees who are held on United States soil. The
argument is that for citizens held in the country, at least, it is beyond the
authority of Congress to forbid courts from ordering those detainees
released. First, in response, while the reaffirmation of the authority to
detain in TDERRA allows the President to detain citizens in the United
States under the law of war, such as Padilla, whether to use that
authority would be up to the President. Given the courts’ skepticism of
the detention of both Padilla, a citizen, and al-Marri, a permanent legal
resident captured in the United States, future Presidents may not see the
need to use that authority. Second, beyond holding citizens in the
United States, it is speculative that this or future administrations will
hold any unprivileged enemy belligerents in the United States. Third,
even if citizens are held in the United States under the law of war, it is
possible that the courts would view this instruction as they likely would
in application to non-citizens held at Guantanamo — as a reasonable
(and compliant with constitutional due process guarantees) way to
effectuate a release order of the judiciary without abrogating the
responsibility of the executive to protect national security.
III. SOME REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AFTER
241

S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(h) (2010).
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TDERRA
TDERRA deals exclusively with the problems posed by the
habeas proceedings for current and future law of war detainees. By
reforming the procedures by which such habeas petitions are
adjudicated, the proceedings will take on added legitimacy with the
input of Congress and the President. Judges will be relieved of the duty
to create procedural rules and will be able to focus on applying the new
legislation to the cases before them, and the dicey political and legal
problems posed by the possibility of a detainee being ordered released
into the United States are defused. While accomplishing those goals
would be no small feat, the legislation does not touch the even more
contentious issues of congressional backing for administrative longterm detention procedures and the closing of Guantanamo Bay. These
issues will likely remain for the foreseeable future, as there is little
evidence that there is the political will on the part of Congress and the
President to confront them. If Congress and the President decline to
answer the call of the habeas judges and fail to pass TDERRA or similar
legislation (which many may see as necessary, even if they disagree on
the details), one imagines that legislation on long-term detention and
closure of Guantanamo Bay will not be signed in the foreseeable future.
This is not to say that these are the only two issues that will remain to
be addressed after passage of the TDERRA or similar legislation, but
they are certainly two prominent examples.
Long-term detention of unprivileged enemy belligerents by the
242
United States is ongoing. The ARB process of annual review was a
process for annual reevaluation of detainees to determine whether
243
244
detention was still necessary. ARBs are no longer occurring, but in
March 2011, the Obama administration issued an executive order to
245
establish a similar review process. The administration is decreasing
242
See generally Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney
Gen.) [hereinafter Oversight] (discussing detainees who will be neither tried nor released).
243
News Release, Dep’t of Def., Administrative Review Implementation Directive
Issued (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?
releaseid=7737.
244
A Department of Defense publication indicates that the last ARB occurred in
February 2009. DEP’T OF DEF., ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD SUMMARY (2009),
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/arb4.pdf; See also Charlie Savage, Detainee
Review Proposal is Prepared for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/us/22gitmo.html.
245
Press Release, The White House, supra note 7.
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the population at Guantanamo Bay largely through transfers to other
countries, but officials believe that there are forty-eight detainees who
will likely not be released because they pose too great of a national
246
security risk. Whether or not that prediction ends up being true, those
detainees should be reviewed at least annually to determine whether
there is still a need to detain them. Such a review should be
administrative, with the decision-making board made of the various
relevant agencies (DHS, Department of Defense, Department of Justice,
Director of National Intelligence, etc.), and the detainee should be
provided a personal representative. The key inquiries for such a review
board should be whether the detainee has intelligence value and
247
continues to pose a threat to the national security of the United States,
and the detainee should be allowed to provide evidence of steps taken
post-capture to reform and separate himself from enemy groups. With
such a review in place, the American people and the world could rest
assured that these detainees will not serve a de facto life sentence
248
without an opportunity for release.
Political resistance to a congressionally-required review of this
sort would likely come from those who claim to have detainees’ best
interests at heart. For some on the political left, the negative of
statutorily enshrining a system of long-term detention would outweigh
249
the benefit of the review that would run to the detainees. In fact,
though, long-term detention of law of war detainees is currently
246

Oversight, supra note 242 (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen.).
This standard would be in contrast to the standard before the habeas courts, which is
whether a detainee is covered by the detention authority of the President. It would be a shift
in focus, from whether a particular detainee could be detained, to whether he should be
detained.
248
The review system established by the Obama administration satisfies several desired
criteria. However, one notable deviation from the ARB process is the standard for
determining whether continued detention is warranted, which is whether it is “necessary to
protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States.” Press Release, The
White House, supra note 7. That standard omits threats to United States allies and
consideration of a detainee’s intelligence value. Id. It also includes considerable vagueness
in the undefined terms “necessary” and “significant.” Id. It remains to be seen how that
standard will be instituted in practice. See id.
249
E.g. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, President Obama Issues Executive
Order Institutionalizing Indefinite Detention (Mar. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/president-obama-issues-executive-orderinstitutionalizing-indefinite-detention (“While appearing to be a step in the right direction,
providing more process to Guantánamo detainees is just window dressing for the reality that
today’s executive order institutionalizes indefinite detention, which is unlawful, unwise and
un-American.”).
247
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ongoing and has been for some time. Given that, it seems that statutorily
requiring an annual administrative review would be to the clear benefit
of the detainees and the transparency of the detention system.
As for closing Guantanamo Bay, despite the President’s
250
executive order at the beginning of his Presidency, there remains a
deep divide in Congress over the wisdom of moving detainees to the
United States, and there is no foreseeable approval for appropriations
251
for such a purpose. One reason for this is that the legal rights of
detainees who are moved from Guantanamo Bay to the United States
remain unclear. Without some degree of certainty that detainees will not
gain additional rights upon their entry into the United States, the
outlook for closing Guantanamo Bay will remain bleak. Of particular
concern is the potential ability of transferred detainees to be released
into the United States if successful in their habeas petitions. Even
252
though the Kiyemba decision in the D.C. Circuit Court was vacated, it
provides a basis for believing that detainees at Guantanamo Bay will not
actually be released into the United States, at least absent a decision by
the Supreme Court.
While Congress debates the closing of Guantanamo Bay, the fact
remains that new detainee transfers to the prison have largely halted
253
since 2004. Because our military and intelligence services have no

250

Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
In considering the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, both the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees rejected the administration’s request for funds to
renovate the prison at Thomson, Illinois, as an ultimate transfer site for Guantanamo
detainees. See Charlie Savage, Closing Guantanamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/politics/26gitmo.html. The 2011 National
Defense Authorization Act prohibited the use of fiscal year 2011 Department of Defense
funds to transfer Guantanamo detainees to the United States, despite protest from President
Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 124 Stat. 4137 (2010); Press Release, The White
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523 (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/07/statement-president-hr-6523
(“Section 1032 [barring the use of funds to transfer detainees into the United States]
represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch authority to
determine when and where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees.”); see Peter Landers,
Congress Bars Gitmo Transfers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704774604576036520690885858.html.
252
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
253
See Huq, supra note 14, at 405 (“Anecdotal information suggests that inflows to the
base in fact largely dried up in 2004, after the Supreme Court’s first interventions in the
field.”).
251
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254

prison in which to hold high-value detainees, one wonders whether
our forces are capturing (and interrogating) all of the enemies that they
could be, and likewise, whether our forces are killing more enemies
255
than they should be. It is unacceptable to risk losing valuable
intelligence and to create ethical dilemmas for our military because
policymakers lack the political will to provide a prison to hold law of
war detainees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite an early flurry of activity and a deadline imposed to close
the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama administration has
shown little appetite for confronting the difficult issues relating to
detention in the War on Terror. Other than a relatively minor revamping
of the military commissions system, President Obama’s pre-election
criticism of Bush administration policies and post-election discussion of
charting a new course in detention policy has dissolved into paralysis
and procrastination. Political demagoguery and legitimate policy
differences among senators and congressmen create an environment
inhospitable to the development of consensus detention legislation, but
those obstacles could be overcome with leadership from the President.
Without that leadership, though, detention policy has merely become a
tool used by those on both the political left and right for their own
electoral reasons.
With the political branches unwilling or unable to confront
detention policy in a serious and substantive way, day-to-day
policymaking has largely fallen to the federal judiciary. This abdication
serves those politicians interested in detention policy only as a political
issue, as they can periodically score points off of the latest
developments while avoiding the responsibility of legislating. In fact,
the very reasons that make the avoidance of detention policy attractive
— responsibility for a complex policy implicating national security and
civil liberties — demand the input of all branches of government. When
254

Charley Keyes, Gates: Prospects for closing Guantanamo ‘very, very low’, CNN,
Feb. 17, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-17/politics/senate.gates.gitmo_1_terroristsdetention-center-military-commissions?_s=PM:POLITICS (“Asked about what the United
States would do about holding so-called high-value targets… [Secretary of Defense] Gates
responded, ‘I think the honest answer to that is, we don’t know.’”).
255
See Cole, supra note 8, at 695-96 (“[A]rguments [that there is no place for detention
of combatants in an armed conflict with foes such as al Qaeda or the Taliban] may be the
perverse effect of encouraging states to use lethal force.”).
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a detainee is released or determined to be lawfully held, the American
people should be confident that the decision was a result of a policy
developed through thoughtful interaction between the branches of
government. Currently, that is not the case.
If enacted, TDERRA or similar legislation would provide muchneeded congressional and presidential input into detainee habeas
proceedings. Undoubtedly, the issues are complex, the stakes are high,
and the politics are potent, but Congress and the President should
coalesce to bless some form of procedural rules for these proceedings.
In their absence, habeas petitions continue to be adjudicated with the
judges suffering from a lack of procedural clarity, the litigants unable to
expect decisional consistency, and the American people impacted by
detention policy written by a single, unelected branch of government.

